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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its Road Commission,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

11028

LLOYD STANGER and EDNA
OLSON STANGER, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

PREFACE
Appellants seek a rehearing and a reconsideration
of the opinion handed down in this matter by this Court
on June 24, 1968. It is submitted that the opinion perpetuated the errors committed by the lower court as to
basic legal principles, and that it was premised on facts
entirely contrary to those established at the jury trial.
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Appellants further contend that the effect of the opinion creates considerable confusion in the field of eminent
domain law in the State of Utah in several respects.
Furthermore, the basic issue of law presented to the
Court was not clearly decided in a manner such as will
furnish guidance in future cases of thi!) general type.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CONSEQUENTIAL AND SEVERANCE
DAMAGES DO NOT BOTH EXIST IN ANY
CASE INVOLVING A SINGLE PROPERTY,
NOR IS IT THE PROVINCE OF A JURY TO
SEGREGATE THE TWO TYPES OF DAMAGES.
In its unanimous opinion this Court made the following comment "Someone certainly should tell the jury the
clifference between the two types of damages one compensable and the other not."
The foregoing statement, referring to severance
damages and consequential damages, contains major
errors under Utah condemnation law. In fact, the
quoted sentence from the opinion is probably the key
error from which several errors of law radiate. As
pointed out in Appellants' Brief at page 10, and following, if there has been a partial taking the entire proceeding as to damages to remaining properties is gov2

erned by sub-section (2) of Section 78-34-10, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 - severance damages. On the
other hand, if there is no underlying taking, then the
proceedings and the type of damages recoverable come
under sub-section (3) of the same statutory section consequential damages. In short, the two types of damages are mutually exclusive and can never be found in
any litigation involving the same piece of property.
There is absolutely no reason why in any case there
should be any cause for a jury to segregate the two types
of damages for the simple reason that the distinction is
one to be decided by the Court as a matter of law. And,
in cases involving the State of Utah, the matter of consequential damages can never get before the jury since
the entire proceeding is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Either the State of Utah is properly
in court as to all damages, or it is not in court at all it is just that simple in eminent domain proceedings.
If there has been no taking, then sovereign immunity
operates to keep the matter clearly out of court in consequential damage situations; if there has been an actual.
taking, then the nature of the damages are severance,
and all pertinent evidence is admissible.
Perhaps the error into which this Court fell in the
quoted statement can best be illustrated by taking the
latter part of the statement, wherein mention is made
that severance damages are compensable and consequential damages are not, and making an analysis of factual
illustrations. To begin with, the statement that conse-
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quential damages are not compensable i_s clearly erroneous, except in situations where sovereign immunity is
the basis for denying recovery. In the previously cited
case of Board of Education of Logan City v. Croft
(1962), 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697, it was clearly
pointed out that consequential damages definitely are
compemable in cases where no actual taking has occurred, if they meet certain requirements. A reading of
that opinion and the basic law ~upporting it further
points out the inconsistency of this Court's opinion in
stating that the sovereign immunity " ... issue was never
raised." When this Court stated that consequential
damages are not compensable - apparently as applied
to this case, it could only do ~o by invoking sovereign
immunity.
Perhaps another approach to illustrate this argument might help the Court. In the case of Springville
Banking Company v. Burton ( 1960), 10 U. 2d 100, 349
P. 2d 157, and the case of Fairclough v. Salt Lake
County (1960), 10 U. 2d 417, 354 P. 2d 105, we actually
had two cases involving consequential damages for the
simple reason that there was no basic underlying taking
such as would bring the governmental agencies into
court. Now, let us assume that in both cases there was
in fact an actual taking of a portion of the property
owner's lands, classfying the type of damages in both
instances as severance damages. Under such a situation
had those two cases gone to trial we would have had a
situation illustrative of the distinction which this Court
might actually have had in mind. In the Springville
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Banking case, since the nature of the damages was
caused by the creation of traffic islands or dividers in
the street, the trial court would have ruled, upon tlH;
offer of evidence of such damage, that the damage was
non-compewable - and that the evidence would not go
to the jury at all. This would be so because the action
taken was a function of the police power in regulating
the flow of traffic.
On the other hand, if we assume that there was an
actual taking of a portion of the properties in the Fairclough case, the matter would have been. entirely different since the taking and the construction of the project
was tied to a substantial change of highway grade affecting the property right of access. The nature of the
damage under such facts would also be severance, but
the evidence of loss of value to the remaining properties
would be clearly admissible under our Utah cases and
those of practically every other jurisdiction known to
the writer, since this type of damage is compensable.
Appellants suggest that the Court probably was
confused in its statements attempting to distinguish
sever~nce and consequential damages by attempting to
consider compensable and non-compensable damages.
In any event, the matter of distinguishing even compensable and non-compensable damages - let alone
severance and consequential damages - is never for
the jury. The segregation and admissibility of any Jdnd
of damages is always the province of the court itself!
5

As pointed out in Appellants' Brief filed in this
matter, this Court has consistently and properly categorized consequential damages in its prior decisions. The
impact of this decision leads one to believe that the
clas~ification of consequential damages in the prior
opinions of this Court was probably accidental. 'l'his is
particularly so since the clear impression now exists as
a result of this opinion that consequential damages and
severance damages can in fact exist a!) to the same property in the same litigation. If this is going to be the
law in Utah then it is respectfully submitted that lawyers and the courts are going to wander into a morass
of confusion for a long time to come.
If one reads the record in this case it will be readily
apparent that appellants' witness gave te.stimony as to
damages to their remaining properties which was premised solely on elements of damage which were properly
compensable. There was no testimony relating to damages to the subject remaining properties based upon
loss of the flow of traffic or similar non-compensable
items. The verdict forms submitted by the Court served
only to confuse the jury by requesting that they attempt
to separate damages of two different types, and without
giving any criteria whatsoever to the jury by which such
damages could in fact be separated, if they so found.
Further, the various illustrations given by the Court to
the jury of situations where damages could not be recovered were completely foreign to the case and could
only be calculated to influence the frame of mind of
the jury against appellants.
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POINT II
DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY SUSTAINED DAMAGES AS A MATTER OF LA'V AND
FACT.
Although this Court'.s opinion proceeded from a
statement that the case simply involved the taking of
.23 of an acre of defendants' land so as to provide them
with an access road for their benefit, such begs the
point of the factual situation involved. The damages
caused to the remaining properties of these defendants
were primarily related to their easements of light and
view (caused by the erection of a 17 foot earthen-fill
overpass directly in front of their home) , and the loss
of their direct access to a previously existing street
which ran in front of their home and as to which they
owned fee title to the center of the road (a right clearly
recognized in this Court's prior decision in Utah Road
Commission v. Hansen (1963), 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d
917) . It was the loss of and damage to these rights
which caused the damages in this case.
Appellants again wish to call the Court's attention
to the Utah cases and those of other jurisdictions which
clearly recognize that damages sustained by remaining
properties resutling from a change in grade. Factually,
it is submitted that the Court in its opinion in this case
avoided the factors causing damages to appellants' remaining properties, as well as the actual property rights
taken.
In this Court's opinion considerable emphasis was
7

placed on the contention that the jury found that " ...
there were no damages at all - severance, con~equen
tial or otherwise." Actually, it is rather easy to pick up
such a statement out of context if this Court chooses
to completely disregard the underlying facts, as will
shortly be pointed out. However, in the next to the last
paragraph of the opinion in this case a comment was
made relative to conversation concerning neighbors t)uffering no loss due to the construction of the freeway
project.

As pointed out and referenced in Appellants' Brief
(p. 24, 26) the pattern of damage to neighboring properties was brought into the lawsuit by the plaintiff in
an attempt to show that others in the general vicinity
had in fact sustained damages to their remaining properties similar in nature to those suffered by defendants.
This evidence came into the litigation in form and testimony exactly opposite to the impression given by the
Court in the next to the last paragraph of its opinion. '
Further, the attempt to show similar damages to 0ther
properties was introduced through the State's appraiser
because his entire analysis of damages to defendants'
properties was predicated upon a finding that the damages to their properties had to be different in kind from
those sustained by neighboring properties. It was just
this type of approach - completely opposite to the impression secured by the Court in writing its opinion that gave the State's appraiser reason and basis for
stating that the remaining properties of the defendants
had in fact sustained no damages at all.
1
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POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD CLEARLY RULE
WHETHER THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SEVERANCE DAMAGES IN AN
EMINENT DOMAIN ACTION MUST BE
SPECIAL AND UNIQUE FROM THOSE SUSTAINED BY OTHER PROPERTIES IN THE
GENERAL NEIGHBORHOOD IN ORDER TO
BE CONSIDERED.
From a careful reading of the opinion it would
appear rather clear that the basic issue submitted to
this Court has not been answered in a manner which
will be of assistance in future cases of this type. This
Court comments upon the use of the word "uniqm;" as
possibly having been unfortunate, but later in cm:isidering the claimed inaccuracy in in.struction No. 7 raises
a doubt as to whether the challenged portion of the
instruction has merit. As such, it is submitted that the
opinion as written leaves the issue entirely in the clouds
and serves no assistance as to similar situations which
will arise in the future.
Whether severance damages must be special and
unique from similar damages sustained by other properties in the general neighborhood who may or may not
be in Court is a matter which this Court should clearly
resolve. If it wishes to take a position contrary to every
jurisdiction which has approached the matter, then such
should be done. But the matter needs resolving and, if
not clearly resolved at this time, will probably be before
"9

the Court for a clear-cut determination in the near
future.
CONCLUSION
As a lawyer primarily involved in trial work relating to eminent domain matters, the opinion in this case
needs a complete revision. If this Court chooses to
stand on its position relative to the facts asserted in its
opinion, then that is clearly its province. But, as a member of the Bar of the State of Utah sincerely interested
in assisting this Court in establishing clear-cut legal
principle_s in eminent domain cases so as to advance the
administration of justice, this writer earnestly solicits
the Court to review its opinion and to properly outline
the legal principles governing cases such as this - even
if it cannot be persuaded to change its decision in the
instant case.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER
Attorney for Appellants
15 East 4th South Street

Salt Lake City, Utah
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